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Abstract
Recently, several papers have re-examined the so called production efficiency theorem and
the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem on commodity taxes in the optimal taxation literature.
Naito (1998) showed that indirect redistribution through production distortion or consump-
tion distortion can Pareto-improve welfare and that the two theorems do not necessarily hold
when different factors are imperfect substitutes and factor prices are endogenous. On the
other hand, Saez (2001) argued that in the long run where human capital accumulation is
endogenous, the two theorems are still valid. This paper points out that the result of Saez
(2003) depends on the assumption on the dimension of the type of human capital. This paper
shows that if different people have different comparative advantage in accumulating different
types of human capital, the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem does not hold.
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1 Introduction
Whether efficient income redistribution should be done through income taxation alone or should
be complemented with other measures such as production distortion or consumption distortion
is one of the key issues whenever optimal public policies are discussed. With this regard, the pro-
duction efficiency theorem (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971), which states that production distortion
is not optimal and the Atkinson and Stiglitz’s result on optimal commodity taxation (Atkinson
and Stiglitz, 1976, 1980), which shows that commodity taxation is not necessary in the presence
of an income tax system, are the most important results in public finance literature.
Recently, in public finance literature researchers started examining those results. For example,
Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet (2001) showed that the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem does not hold
when individuals are different in ability and endowment. Saez (2003) showed that the Atkinson
and Stiglitz theorem does not hold when tastes are heterogenous. Naito (1999) showed that in
a model similar to the model of Stiglitz (1982) if multiple goods are produced and factor prices
are endogenous, the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem does not necessarily hold and the production
efficiency result does not either. On the other hand, Saez (2003) argued that when human
capital accumulation is endogenous, then the Diamond and Mirrlees theorem and the Atkinson
and Stiglitz theorem still hold.
In this paper, we show that the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem does not hold even if human
capital accumulation is endogenous contrary to Saez (2003). Consider a standard Harberger
model and assume that there are skilled human capital intensive sector and unskilled human
capital intensive sector. In this economy, if the government imposes a commodity tax on the
skilled human capital intensive good, then the return from the skilled human capital will decrease
and the return from the unskilled human capital will increase. Saez (2003) showed in this situation
an indirect redistribution through the changes of the return from the skilled and unskilled human
capital is redundant when human capital accumulation is endogenous. However, the analysis of
Saez (2003) assumes that the types of human capital is one dimensional. In reality, different
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people have different comparative advantage in accumulating different types of human capital.
The present paper shows that in the presence of comparative advantage, the Atkinson and Stiglitz
theorem does not hold even if human capital is endogenous.
To illustrate the basic idea, consider a situation where people with higher ability have com-
parative advantage in accumulating skilled human capital and people with lower ability have
comparative advantage in accumulating unskilled human capital. Also, assume that the govern-
ment cannot observe individual accumulated human capital but can observe only income level.
For example, when an individual’s income is high, there are three possibilities: this individual has
high ability; this individual has a high level of skilled human capital; this individual has a very
high level of unskilled human capital. But the government does not know which case applies to
this individual. In this situation, a nonlinear income tax can be used for income redistribution,
but the power of a nonlinear income tax is limited due to the unobservability of individual human
capital levels and types. On the other hand, by imposing a commodity tax, the government can
change the returns from skilled and unskilled human capital. Such indirect redistribution might
complement an income tax when the individual level of human capital is unobservable.
The crucial assumption in the present paper is the presence of comparative advantage in
human capital accumulation. Whether such an assumption is reasonable or not is an interesting
empirical question. Earlier literature of the human capital theory assumed that earning could be
explained completely once it is conditioned by human capital level. Earlier empirical evidence
showed that there is a strong correlation between earnings and the level of human capital and
indicated that ability does not matter for explaining earnings once they are conditioned by the
human capital levels. On the other hand, recent literature of labor economics and self-selection
emphasizes that ability can also increase earning and play a systematic role for explaining earnings
even after it is conditioned by the human capital level. This literature points out that even in
an extreme case when human capital does not increase the productivity at all, if ability can
increase the productivity and if higher ability agents tend to acquire more skills, there will be a
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correlation between human capital level and earnings. In the standard signaling literature, it is
commonly assumed that a higher ability person would get more benefit from acquiring skill. In
addition, recently, Dinardo and Tobias (2001) and Tobias (2003) examined whether the returns
from schooling are higher for high ability individuals than for low ability individuals by using a
non-parametric method. They found that the returns are higher for high ability individuals than
for low ability individuals. This suggests that assuming the presence of comparative advantage
is not unrealistic as an approximation of the reality.
To prove that the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem does not hold in a closed economy, we need
to address several issues. In this paper, we assume that the economy is a closed economy in
contrast to the case of proving that production inefficiency (Naito, 2003). This implies that
the prices of goods and factors become endogenous and the effects of a commodity tax can be
complex since factor supplies would also change. Second, when the factor prices are endogenous,
it is well-known that the marginal income tax rate for some individuals can be negative. In
such a situation, it is not obvious that indirect redistribution through changes of the return from
both skilled and unskilled human capital can increase the social welfare. Despite such questions,
however, we prove that the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem does not hold even when human capital
is endogenous.
At this point, readers might wonder about the difference between Naito (2003) and the present
paper. In Naito (2003), we assumed that the economy is open economy since our interest is on
commercial policy. In an open economy, the commodity tax cannot affect the factor prices due
to the famous factors rice equalization theorem (Samuelson 1949). Therefore, the Atkinson and
Stiglitz theorem is valid. In contrast, in a closed economy, the commodity tax can affect the
factor prices. Thus, we analyze the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem in a closed economy.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next sub-section, we shows the main result
by assuming that two types of human capital are perfect substitutes in the utility function. Then,
we analyze the case when two types of human capital are imperfect substitutes. In section 3, we
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briefly make conclusions.
2 Analysis
2.1 The basic model
The economy is a closed economy where there are two output goods: good 1 and good 2. Good
1 is skilled human capital intensive good and good 2 is unskilled human capital intensive good.
We assume that there are two types of human capital in this economy: skilled human capital and
unskilled human capital. We assume that the two types of human capital are perfect substitutes in
the utility function. This implies that people accumulate only one type of human capital. Besides
the reason mentioned in the previous section, conducting a welfare analysis when individual
behavior includes a discrete choice is useful from a theoretical standpoint as well. In many
important economic situations such as the choice of location to live, the choice of technology
by firms and labor market participation, decisions made by consumers or firms include discrete
choices. Until very recently, welfare analysis that includes discrete choices was rare. As far as
the author knows, only Boadway and Cuff (2001) started to investigate this issue very recently.
They analyzed an optimal taxation problem when some individuals are bunched at the bottom.
Another purpose of this section is to contribute to such a literature as well. As for individuals,
there are a continuum of agents and all agents have identical, additive separable utility functions
with respect to consumption, skilled human capital investment and unskilled human capital
investment. We index all individuals’ ability by i where i takes any value from one to two. We
assume that the utility function of type i agent has the following form:
u(c1i, c2i)− ashsi − auhui
where u(c1i, c2i) is strictly increasing with each argument and strictly concave. We assume that
the utility function is homothetic. This implies that the demand function does not depend
on income distribution of this economy. This assumption simplifies the analysis substantially.
We assume that the labor supply is fixed and it is normalized to one. hsi and h
u
i are the level of
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skilled and unskilled human capital of individual i. hsi and h
u
i can be interpreted as the knowledge
levels, years of education, experience and training for each type of skill. Given the amount of
skilled human capital and unskilled human capital of individual i, we assume that the earning of
individual i is determined as
earningi = gsi × ws × hsi + gui × wu × hui (1)
where ws and wu are the returns from one efficient unit of skilled and unskilled human capital,
respectively. (1) means that when individual i accumulates hsi units of skilled human capital and
hui units of unskilled human capital, the efficient unit of skilled human capital and unskilled human
capital are gsi × hsi and gui × hui and the total return from skilled human capital and unskilled
human capital are gsi × ws × hsi and gui × wu × hsi , respectively. Let gsi × ws and gui × wu
be wsi and w
u
i . Denote (dgji/di) as g
′
ji where j=s,u. g
′
si/gsi and g
′
ui/gui measure the absolute
advantage of an agents with ability i +  over agent i in accumulating skilled human capital
and unskilled human capital, respectively. We assume that agents who have higher ability have
absolute advantage in accumulating both skilled human capital and unskilled human capital:
g′si/gsi > 0 and g
′
ui/gui.
1 Also, as we discussed in the introduction, we assume that agents
who have higher ability have comparative advantage in accumulating skilled human capital than
unskilled human capital. Thus, we assume that
g′si
gsi
>
g′ui
gui
(2)
The economic meaning of the above equation is that as ability becomes higher, the return from
accumulating skilled human capital becomes lager than the return from accumulating unskilled
human capital.
As for the objective of the government, we assume that the social planner will maximize the
following utilitarian social welfare function:
1The assumption of the absolute advantage is not necessary. The assumption of the absolute advantage is a
sufficient condition that guarantees that agents who have higher i will receive higher utility. As long as agents with
higher ability can receive higher utility the assumption of the absolute advantage is not necessary.
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∫ 2
1
{u(c1i, c2i)− ashsi − auhui }nidi . (3)
As for prices, we normalize the producer price and the consumer price of good 2 to one. Let
p1 and t be the producer price of good 1 and the specific tax on good 1. Then, the consumer
price of good 1 is p1 + t.
For production side, we assume the standard Harberger model. In this economy, there are
two sectors. The sector 1 is the skilled human capital intensive sector and it produces good
1. The sector 2 is the unskilled human capital intensive sector and it produces good 2. Each
sector uses both skilled and unskilled human capital. Consumers (workers) are perfectly mobile
between two sectors. When an agent who has hsi units of skilled human capital and h
u
i units of
unskilled human capital works in sector k, it means that sector k uses gsi × hsi units of skilled
human capital and gui×hui units of unskilled human capital. Each sector behaves as a price taker
and maximizes its profit. Let F k(Hsk,H
u
k ) be the production function in sector k = 1, 2 where
Hsk and H
u
k are the total amount of skilled human capital and unskilled human capital used in
sector k. We assume that F k(Hsk,H
u
k ) exhibits constant returns to scale and it is concave with
respect to both arguments. Let ck(ws, wu) be the cost function in sector k to produce one unit
of output in sector k when the returns of one efficient unit of skilled human capital and unskilled
human capital are ws and wu, respectively. When both good 1 and good 2 are produced at the
equilibrium, ws and wu are determined
p1 = c1(ws, wu) and 1 = c2(ws, wu), (4)
From the Stolper -Samuelson theorem, ∂ws/∂p1 > 0 and ∂wu/∂p1 < 0.
The output of both goods are determined from the following factor market equilibrium con-
ditions:
∂c1
∂ws
y1 +
∂c2
∂ws
y2 = Hs, and
∂c1
∂wu
y1 +
∂c2
∂wu
y2 = Hu (5)
where Hs =
∫ 2
i∗
gsi × hsi × nidi and Hu =
∫ i∗
1
gui × hui × nidi
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Hs and Hu are the total skilled and unskilled human capital in this economy. Although the
output of both goods can be calculated from equation (5), it is more useful to work on the
production possibility frontier for analytical reasons. Let Hs and Hu be the total amount of skill
human capital and unskilled human capital in this economy and define a production possibility
frontier as Γ(Hs,Hu). Since the production functions are concave and the factor intensity of the
two sectors are different, the production possibility set is convex. The output of good 1 and good
2 are determined as the solution of the following constrained maximization problem:
max p1y1 + y2 s.t. (y1, y2) ∈ Γ(Hs,Hu)
Thus, we can think that the output of good 1 and good 2 can be thought as a function of p1,
Hs and Hu. Let Y 1(p1,Hu,Hu) and Y 2(p1,Hu,Hu) be the output function of good 1 and good
2. At the optimum, the slope of production possibility set is equal to the relative producer
price of good 1. Thus, we obtain Y 1p ≡ ∂Y 1/∂p1 > 0. The Rybcyzynski theorem shows that
Y 1Hu ≡ ∂Y 1/∂Hu < 0 and Y 1Hs ≡ ∂Y 1/∂Hs > 0. Similarly, for good 2, we have Y 2p < 0, Y 1Hs > 0,
Y 1Hu < 0.
The prices in this economy are determined so that the output of good 1 and good 2 are equated
to the demand for good 1 and good 2, respectively. On the other hand, to find the equilibrium
price, it is easy to focus on the relative demand since the utility function is homothetic and
the relative demand is independent of income level. Let RD(p1 + t) is the relative demand of
good 1. Because of the homotheticity of the utility function, it is independent of income level and
RDp ≡ dRD/dp1 < 0. Let RS(p1,Hs,Hu) be the relative supply of good 1. From the shape of the
production possibility frontier and the Rybcyzynski theorem, we have RSp ≡ ∂RS/∂(p1+ t) > 0,
RSHs ≡ ∂RS/∂Hs > 0, RSHu ≡ ∂RS/∂Hu < 0. The equilibrium price is determined from the
following equation:
RD(p1 + t) = RS1(p1,Hs,Hu)
From the above equation, the equilibrium price can be a function of t, Hs and Hu. Thus we can
write the price of good 1 as p1 = p1(t,Hs,Hu). Once the price of good 1 is determined, then the
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returns from skilled and unskilled human capital are determined by (4).
When two types of skill accumulation are perfect substitutes in the disutility function, the
agent always solves the following constrained disutility minimization problem:
Z(wsi , w
u
i , R) ≡ min ashsi + auhui
st R = wsih
s
i + w
u
i h
u
i
where wsi = gsi × ws and wui = gui × wu
In the above problem, for an agent with ability i, if as/au < wsi /w
u
i he will accumulate only skilled
human capital and if as/au > wsi /w
u
i , he will accumulate only unskilled human capital. Note that
because of the assumption of comparative advantage (2), wsi /w
u
i is an increasing function of i.
Let i∗ be i that satisfies (ws×gsi)/(wu×gui) = as/au. Then, agents whose ability is greater than
i∗ accumulate only skilled human capital and agents whose ability i is less than i∗ accumulate
only unskilled human capital. We assume that such i∗ is located within 1 and 2.2 Given such i∗
, Z(wsi , w
u
i , R) is
Z(wsi , w
u
i , R) = a
s(
R
wsi
) for i∗ ≤ i ≤ 2
Z(wsi , w
u
i , R) = a
u(
R
wui
) for 1 ≤ i < i∗.
Let X(R) be an after-tax income schedule that the government designs. Then, each agent chooses
his best R to maximize U(p2, X(R)) − Z(wsi , wui , R). Once R is chosen, an agent chooses his
optimal skill type and accumulates human capital to generate pre-tax income R. Let v˜(i) be the
maximized value given the schedule X(R):
v˜(i) ≡ max
R
U(p1 + t,X(R))− Z(wsi , wui , R).
where U(p1 + t,X) is the indirect utility function when the price of good 1 is p1 + t and
income is X. For the analysis of the optimal schedule of X(R), we assume that the schedule of
2This assumption is not so restrictive as the following reason. For example, if i∗ is greater than 2, all agents
will accumulate only unskilled human capital. However, the production needs both skilled and unskilled human
capital. As a result, the return from skilled human capital will start to increase and the return from unskilled
human capital will start to decrease. This implies that i∗ will start to decrease. This process will continue until
some agents start to accumulate skilled human capital.
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X(R) is a continuous function. Although it is possible that the optimal schedule of X(R) is not
continuous, the tax schedules of almost of all developed countries are continuous. When X(R) is
a continuous function, it is straightforward to show that v˜(i) is continuous with respect to i from
the theory of the maximum (Berge 1963). In addition, there is an interesting property on v˜(i)
in the neighborhood of i∗ that turns out to be crucial for our result. The following lemma shows
that property of v˜(i).
Lemma 1 When i increases, the graph of v˜(i) has a counter-clockwise kink at i∗.
Proof. Let v˜s(i) be the maximized utility of an agent with ability i given the tax schedule when
he can accumulate only skilled human capital. Also, let v˜u(i) be the maximized utility of an
agent with ability i when he can accumulate only unskilled human capital. By the definition, the
graph of v˜(i) is the upper envelope of v˜s(i) and v˜u(i) and i∗ is at the intersection between v˜s(i)
and v˜u(i). This implies that there is a counter-clockwise kink at i∗ (See also Figure 1). 
Now consider the problem of designing a nonlinear income tax system. Let (Rj , Xj) be the
pre-tax income and after tax income when an agent announces that his type is j. Then define
v(i) and v̂(j; i) as follows:
v(i) = max
{j}
U(p1 + t,Xj)− Z(wsi , wui , Rj)
v̂(j; i) = U(p1 + t,Xj)− Z(wsi , wui , Rj)
v(i) is the maximized utility given the schedule of (Rj , Xj) and v̂(j; i) is the indirect utility when
agent i announces that he is type j. The global incentive compatibility condition implies that
type i agent has an incentive to announce that he is type i:
i = argmax
{j}
v̂(j; i) (6)
Assuming the differentiability of (Xj , Rj), the first order condition of the incentive compatibility
condition is
∂v̂(j, i)
∂j
∣∣∣∣
j=i
=
∂U
∂x
∂x
∂j
− ∂Z
∂R
∂R
∂j
= 0
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On the other hand, by using the definition of Z(wsi , w
u
i , Rj), we can calculate dv(i)/di for i in
(1, i∗) and (i∗, 2).
dv
di
= as
g′si
gsi
Ri
gsiws
for i ∈ (i∗, 2) (7)
dv
di
= au
g′ui
gui
(
Ri
guiwu
) for i ∈ (1, i∗) (8)
Next we will check a single crossing property of the utility function U(p1+t,X)−Z(R,ws, wu, R).
The marginal rate of substitution between X and R is
MRS(R,X) =
1
Ux
as
gsiws
for i ∈ (i∗, 2)
=
1
Ux
au
guiwu
for i ∈ (1, i∗)
Thus the MRS(R,X) is a decreasing function of i and a single crossing property is satisfied. This
means that the local incentive compatibility constraint (7) and (8) and the monotone condition
of R are sufficient conditions for the global incentive compatibility (6) (Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991). Through the analysis of this paper, we assume that the monotonicity constraint is not
binding.3
Given the first order conditions of the incentive compatibility constraint of it is useful to think
that the government controls v(i) and Ri and that Xi is defined from the following relationship:
v(i) = U(p1 + t,X)− Z(wsi , wui , Rj) (9)
Let x(R, v, p1 + t, wsi , w
u
i ) be the solution that solves (9) about X. Obviously, ∂x/∂v = (Ux)
−1
, ∂x/∂Ri = ZR/Ux and ∂x/∂p = −(Up)/(Ux), ∂x/∂p = −(Up)/(Ux) ,∂x/∂wsi = Zwsi /(Ux) and
∂x/∂wu = Zwu/(Ux).
Finally for analytical convenience, rewrite the first order condition of (7) and (8) :
v˙s =
g′si
gsi
ashsi and v˙
u =
g′ui
gui
auhui .
3This assumption is equivalent to assuming that
there is no bunching. Many of the previous papers assumed that there is no bunching at the optimum. (Konishi
1995, Naito 1998).
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Based on the setup, the purpose of the government is to solve the following programming problem:
W (t) = max
∫ i∗
1
vu(i)nidi+
∫ 2
i∗
vs(i)nidi
st. v˙s =
g′si
gsi
ashsi for i
∗ < i ≤ 2 (IC1)
v˙u =
g′ui
gui
auhui for 1 < i < i
∗ (IC2)
vs(i∗) = vu(i∗) (BD1)
Rsi∗ = R
u
i∗ (BD2)∫ 2
i∗
{Rsi − x(Rsi , vsi , wsi , wui , p1 + t)}nidi
+
∫ i∗
1
{Rui − x(Rui , vui , wsi , wui , p1 + t)}nidi
+t
∫ 2
1
nic1idi ≥ 0 (RC)
Hs =
∫ 2
i∗
hsigs(i)nidi,H
u =
∫ i∗
1
hui gu(i)nidi (SHC,UHC)
where
p1 = p1(t,Hs,Hu), v
j
i = v
j(i),
The above programming problem deserves several comments. First, (IC1) and (IC2) are the
local incentive compatibility constraints. Second, (BD1) comes from the assumption that the tax
schedule that the government designs is continuous and, as a result, the utility level of the agents
must be continuous. (BD2) comes from the assumption that individual i∗ chooses only one R.
Now let µsi ,µ
u
i and λ be the Lagrangian multipliers of (IC1),(IC2) and (RC). Let β1,β2, βs and
βu be the Lagrangian multipliers of (BD1), (BD2), (SHC) and (UHC). The first order conditions
can be calculated and we will write them in the Appendix to save the space. Then, what we
need to know is the effect of increasing t from zero on the social welfare, which is equivalent to
dW/dt. By using the envelope theorem, we have (See Appendix)
dW
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= Ψ1
di∗
dp1
{
µsi∗a
shsi∗
g′s
gs
− µui∗auhui∗
g′u
gu
}
(10)
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where Ψ1 =
−RDp
RDp −RSp +RSHs ∂i∗∂p1 gsi∗hsi∗ −RSHu ∂i
∗
∂p1
gui∗hui∗
< 0
From the FOC of vsi∗ and v
u
i∗ , we have µ
s
i∗ = µ
u
i∗ . In addition, as we show in the Appendix, µ
s
i
and µui are positive. Furthermore a
shsi∗(g
′
s/gs) and a
uhui∗(g
′
u/gu) are the right hand slope of v
s
i
and the left hand slope vui at i
∗. From Lemma 1, the slope of vsi is steeper than the slope of v
u
i
at i∗. Since di
∗
dp1
< 0, we have dW/dt > 0.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the social planner designs a nonlinear income tax system to max-
imize the utilitarian social welfare function without a commodity tax. Then, introducing a com-
modity tax on an skilled human capital intensive good will increase the social welfare.
In the above equation (10), Ψ1 shows a change of the price of good 1 when t increases in a
compensated way.4 Second, as for the meaning of the inside of the bracket in (10), it is useful
to see Figure 1. In Figure 1, when the government increases the commodity tax t from zero,
the graph of v˜s(i) will shift downward and the graph of v˜u(i) shifts upward. As a result, i∗ will
increase. Also, notice that from (IC1) and (IC2), the slope of v˜s(i) increases and the slope of
v˜u(i) decreases. The inside of the bracket is the difference of the slops of two curves.
In the mechanism designs problem, v˙, the slope of the value function, is related with how the
compensation schedule must be sensitive with unobserved ability. When v˙ is higher, it means that
the social planner needs to give higher utility to those with higher ability. With redistributive
social welfare function, the social planner wants to give higher utility to agents with lower ability.
Thus, when v˙ is high, the level of utility that the social planner can give to the agents with lower
ability is limited since the amount of the resource is limited. In such a situation, if the government
can make v˙ smaller exogenously, it is possible to increase the social welfare and changing t can
be a good policy tool for changing v˙.
4First note that the total skilled and unskilled human capital are functions of the price of good1. Thus, for a
given level of the commodity tax, the equilibrium price can be determined from
RS(t + p1) = RS(p1, H
s(p1), H
u(p1)). Second, − ∂i∗∂p1 gsi∗h
s
i∗ and
∂i∗
∂p1
gui∗h
u
i∗ are the compensated change of
supply of skilled and unskilled human capital when the price of good 1 increases. Thus, we obtain dp1/dt = Ψ1
12
When t increases, the change of v˙ is not the same for all individuals however. As Figure
1 shows, all individuals whose ability is lower than i∗ will experience a decrease of v˙ and all
individuals whose ability is greater than i∗ will experience an increase of v˙ except the neighbor-
hood of i∗. But, as the analysis in the Appendix shows, the effect of a change of v˙ for those
agents is of the second order and can be replicated by the adjustment of the nonlinear income
system. On the other hand, there are some individuals who experience the first order change of
v˙. Individuals whose ability is in (i∗, i∗+(di∗/dp1)(dp1/dt)) will switch from accumulating skilled
human capital to unskilled human capital. Since the graph of v(i) has a counter-clockwise kink
at i∗, individuals in (i∗, i∗+(di∗/dp1)(dp1/dt)) will experience the first order decrease of v˙. This
implies that the government needs less ability-sensitive compensation schedules for those agents.
Because this change of v˙ has the first order effect, it will increase the social welfare.
(10) can be interpreted in terms of the marginal tax schedule as well. Note that (∂Z/∂Rm)/Ux
is equal to 1−Tmi where Tmi is the marginal tax rate of income of those who accumulatedm = s, u
type of skill and his ability is equal to i. From the FOC of Rsi and R
u
i ,
λnT si = µ
s
i × as
∂hsi
∂Rsi
g′s
gs
and λnT ui = µ
u
i × au
∂hui
∂Rui
g′u
gu
Thus, Since (∂h/∂R)×R = h, we have
dW
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= Ψ1
di∗
dp1
λn(Rsi∗T
s
i∗ −Rui∗T ui∗).
T si∗ and T
u
i∗ are the marginal tax rates of individuals just above i
∗ and just below i∗, respectively.
When t increases in a compensated way, the price of good 1 will increase by Ψ1 taking the effect
of the change of human capital into consideration. When the price of good 1 will increase, i∗ will
change by di∗/∂p1. Then, an individual just above i∗ who initially accumulated skilled human
capital will switch from accumulating skilled human capital to unskilled human capital. Since the
marginal tax rate of those who accumulated skilled human capital is higher than the marginal
tax rate for those who accumulated unskilled human capital around i∗, the marginal tax rate will
decrease.5 Thus, Rsi∗T
s
i∗ − Rui∗T ui∗ is the earning that is affected by a change of the marginal tax
5Readers still might wonder why the marginal tax rate for those who accumulated skilled human capital is
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rates. Since this change of the marginal tax rate is of the first order, it can increase the social
welfare.
2.2 A case of Imperfect Substitutes
In the previous sub-section, we consider a case where two types of human capital are perfect
substitutes. As a result, each person accumulates only one type of human capital. In reality,
however, individual might accumulate both types of human capital. It is important to check
the robustness of our proposition when two types of human capital are imperfect substitutes. In
addition, in a model where two types of human capital are perfect substitutes, the income tax
does not affect the decision regarding which type of human capital to accumulate. One way to
make human capital accumulation depend on the income tax system is to assume that two types
of human capital are imperfect substitutes.
In order to make two types of human capital are imperfect substitutes, we assume that the
utility function of type i agent has the following form:
u(c1i, c2i)− fs(hsi )− fu(hui ).
Regarding u(c1i, c2i), we make the same assumption as in the previous section. As for fj(hsi )
(j=s,u), fj(h
j
i ) is strictly increasing and strictly convex. The labor supply is fixed. In addition,
to simplify the analysis, we assume that fs(hsi ) and f(h
u
i ) have the following functional forms:
6
fs(hsi ) = (h
s
i )
γs and fs(hui ) = (h
u
i )
γu
where γs and γu measure the curvature of the disutility functions of skilled and unskilled human
capital accumulation respectively and they are strictly greater than one. Given the amount of
skilled human capital and unskilled human capital of individual i, we assume that the earning
of individual i is determined as we assumed in the previous subsection. Agents who have higher
higher than those who accumulated unskilled human capital around i∗. The reason is around the right hand side
of i∗, the marginal return from ability is higher at the right hand side of i∗ than at the left hand side of i∗ because
i∗ is a switching point.
6Our main results can hold in more general functional forms.
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ability have comparative advantage in accumulating skilled human capital than unskilled human
capital. More specifically, we assume that
g′si
gsi
>
g′ui
gui
γu
γs
. (11)
(11) implies that when the disutility of accumulating human capital is not constant, the compar-
ative advantage condition need to be adjusted by the curvature of the disutility function.7
As for the objective of the government, the prices, and the production side of the economy,
we make the same assumptions as in the previous sub-section.
As for designing an income tax system, it is useful to analyze in two steps. The first step is
to know how an individual i will choose skilled human capital and unskilled human capital to
generate pre-tax income, R. The second step is to know, given an after-tax-income schedule of
X = R− T (R), how each individual chooses pre-tax income.
The first stage of the problem can be solved considering the following programming problem:
min fs(hsi ) + fu(h
u
i ) (12)
s.t. R = wsi × hsi + wui × hui
where wsi = gsi × ws and wui = gui × wu
Let the minimized value of the above problem be Z(wsi , w
u
i , R). Z(w
s
i , w
u
i , R) is the minimized
disutility to generate the pre-tax income R for an agent whose net returns from skilled human
capital and unskilled capital are wsi and w
u
i , respectively. We denote the solution of the above
problem as hsi (w
s
i , w
u
i , R) and h
u
i (w
s
i , w
u
i , R). For the analysis later, it is useful to calculate com-
pensated human capital supply. Consider the following dual problem of (12):
E(wsi , w
u
i , V ) ≡ max wsihsi + wui hui
st. fs(hsi ) + fu(h
u
i ) ≤ V
7The economic interpretation of (11) is as follows. Consider a condition that type i and type i+ε agents have the
same degree of comparative advantage. Equation (11) says that if the marginal disutility of accumulating skilled
human capital grows faster than the marginal disutility of accumulating unskilled human capital (γs > γu), then
the increase of the return from skilled human capital, g′si/gsi, can be lower than the increase of the return from
unskilled human capital, g′ui/gui, in order to have the same comparative advantage. This is because accumulating
skilled human capital accompanies larger disutility from the first place.
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Let the solution of the above problem be h˜ji (w
s
i , w
u
i , V ) where j = s, u. Then, from the dual
relationship, we will have
hji (w
s
i , w
u
i , E(w
s
i , w
u
i , V )) ≡ h˜ji (wsi , wui , V ) ; j=s,u.
By taking derivative on both sides, we will have the Slutsky equation for hsi and h
u
i :
∂hji
∂wsi
+
∂hji
∂R
hsi =
∂h˜ji
∂wsi
and
∂hji
∂wui
+
∂hji
∂R
hui =
∂h˜ji
∂wui
; j=s,u.
Note that the indifference curve of fs(hsi ) + fu(h
u
i ) is strictly concave. Therefore, ∂h˜
s
i/∂w
s
i > 0,
∂h˜ui /∂w
u < 0, ∂h˜ui /∂w
u
i > 0 and ∂h˜
u
i /∂w
s
i < 0. This relationship means that if an individual
maximizes his earnings holding the total disutility constant, an increase of the net return from
skilled human capital will increase the supply of skilled human capital and an increase of the
return of unskilled human capital will decrease the supply for skilled human capital.
LetX(R) be the after-tax income schedule that the government designed. Then, at the second
stage of the problem, given Z(wsi , w
u, R) and X(R), each individual i will maximize his utility:
max
{R}
U(p1 + t,X(R))− Z(wsi , wui , R) .
The objective of the social planner is to design a schedule of X(R) to maximize the social
welfare. By using the same technique in the previous section, we can calculate dv/dvi: dv/di =
−∑j=s,u Zwji × (dwji /di). Let αi be the Lagrangian multiplier of the required income constraint
in the disutility minimization problem (12). From the FOC of the minimization problem for
Z(wsi , w
u
i , R), we obtain
dv
di
= αiRi{g
′
si
gsi
θsi +
g
′
ui
gui
θui} where θji = w
j
ih
j
i
Ri
. (13)
Because of the assumption from the absolute advantage, dv/di > 0. (13) has a clear economic
meaning. It means that the slope of the value function v(i) is proportional to the weighted
average of the absolute advantage of skilled human capital accumulation and unskilled human
capital accumulation. For analytical reason, it is useful to eliminate αi in the above equation.
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Using the first order condition for hsi and h
u
i , we can rewrite (13) as follows:
dv
di
=
g
′
si
gsi
f ′s(h
s
i )h
s
i +
g
′
ui
gui
f ′(hui )h
u
i . (14)
Given (14), as in the previous section, it is more useful to assume that the social planner
controls vi and Ri and xi is defined by the following relationship:8
v(i) = U(p1 + t,Xi)− Z(wsi , wui , Ri).
The problem of the social planner is to solve the following constrained optimization program:
W (t) = max
{Ri,vi}
∫ 2
1
v(i)nidi
st.
dv
di
=
g
′
si
gsi
f ′s(h
s
i )h
s
i +
g
′
ui
gui
f ′(hui )h
u
i∫ 2
1
ni{Ri − xi}di+ t
∫ 2
1
c1inidi = 0
Hs =
∫
gsih
s
idi , H
u =
∫
guih
u
i di,
where p1 = p1(t,Hs,Hu)
and t is given.
In the above programming problem, W (t) is the maximized social welfare for given t. Also note
that hsi and h
u
i are functions of (Ri, w
s
i , w
u
i ) and that w
s
i and w
u
i are the functions of p1.
After several calculations, we can obtain the following equation (See Appendix):
dW
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= −Ψ2
{∫ 2
1
µi[γs(g
′
si/gsi)− γu(g
′
ui/gui)]f
i
s[
∂h˜si
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+ f ′s
∂h˜si
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
}
(15)
where
Ψ2 =
RDp
RSp −RDp +RSHs
∫ 2
1 g
s
i [
∂h˜si
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+ ∂h˜
s
i
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di+RSHu
∫ 2
1 g
u
i [
∂h˜ui
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+ ∂h˜
u
i
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
and µi is the Lagrangian multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint. Because of the
property of the compensated supply function of hsi , ∂h˜
s
i/∂w
s
i > 0 and ∂h˜
s
i/∂w
u
i < 0. From the
8As for SCP, we can check it by examining ∂
2Z
∂R∂i
> 0. This is true as long as
∂h
j
i
∂R
> 0 for j=s,u.
17
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, ∂wsi /∂p1 > 0 and ∂w
u
i /∂p1 < 0. From the Rybcyzynski theorem,
RSHs > 0 and RSHu < 0. From the assumption on comparative advantage, γs(g
′
si/gsi) −
γu(g
′
ui/gui) > 0. As for the sign of the Lagrangian multiplier of the incentive compatibility
constraint, the standard argument shows that µi > 0 for all i ∈ (1, 2) (See Appendix). Thus, we
obtain dW/dt > 0.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the social planner sets the income tax structure to maximize the
social welfare function in an endogenous skill accumulation model at the zero commodity tax .
Then an introduction of a commodity tax on an skilled-labor-intensive good will increase the social
welfare.
Equation (15) has several implications. For an illustration, consider a situation where the
disutility functions of skilled and unskilled human capital accumulation have the same degree
of curvature, i.e. γs = γu ≡ γ. Then, (15) shows that if (g′si/gsi) = (g
′
ui/gui), dW/dt = 0.
In other words, if there is no comparative advantage and if higher ability individuals are as
good at accumulating skilled and unskilled human capital as lower ability individuals, then there
is no welfare gain from changing the returns of skilled and unskilled human capital. Second,
(∂h˜si/∂w
s
i )(∂w
s
i /∂p1) and (∂h˜
s
i/∂w
u
i )(∂w
u
i /∂p1) measure how changes of returns from each types
of human capital changes the compensated supply of skilled human capital. Third, Ψ2 measure
how a change of the commodity tax t will change the relative price of good 1 taking into the
effect of changes of the supply of human capital into consideration. 9 Also note that γ×f ′s(hsi ) =
f ′′s (hsi )h
s
i +f
′
s(h
s
i ) and that f
′′
s (h
s
i )h
s
i +f
′
s(h
s
i ) is related with a change of v˙. In addition, note that
µi measures how the social welfare increases when the incentive compatibility is relaxed. This
implies that the term after the integration measures how a compensated change of the returns
from skilled and unskilled human capital changes the slope of v˙ and increases the social welfare.
9First note that the total skilled and unskilled human capital are functions of the price of good1. Thus, for a
given level of the commodity tax, the equilibrium price can be determined from
RS(t+ p1) = RS(p1, H
s(p1), H
u(p1)). Second,
∫ 2
1
gsi [
∂h˜si
∂wsi
∂wsi
∂p1
+
∂h˜si
∂wui
∂wui
∂p1
]di and
∫ 2
1
gui [
∂h˜ui
∂wsi
∂wsi
∂p1
+
∂h˜ui
∂wui
∂wui
∂p1
]di are
the compensated change of supply of skilled and unskilled human capital when the price of good 1 increases. Thus,
we obtain dp1/dt = Ψ2
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The intuition of the above proposition is as follows. In a situation where higher ability
individuals have comparative advantage in accumulating skilled human capital and lower ability
individuals have comparative advantage in accumulating unskilled human capital, a decrease of
the return from skilled human capital and an increase of the return from unskilled human capital
will hurt higher ability individuals and benefit lower ability individuals. If the social planner is
interested in redistributing income from high ability individuals to low ability individuals, such
changes of the returns from skilled and unskilled capital can indirectly redistribute income. On
the other hand, starting from zero distortion, the deadweight loss of the commodity tax is of the
second-order but the welfare gain of relaxing the incentive problem has the first-order effect. As
a result, introducing the production distortion increases the social welfare.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined whether using a commodity tax can increase the social welfare in
the presence of a nonlinear income tax system when human capital accumulation is endogenous.
For that purpose, I developed two models where individuals can choose the amount of both
skilled and unskilled human capital based on their comparative advantage. In the first model,
we assumed that skilled human capital and unskilled human capital are perfect substitutes and
that individuals accumulate only skilled or unskilled human capital. In the second model, we
assumed that skilled human capital and unskilled human capital are imperfect substitutes and
that individuals accumulate both types of human capital. Assuming that individuals with higher
ability have comparative advantage in accumulating skilled human capital, we have shown that
indirect redistribution such imposing a tariff on unskilled human capital intensive good can
increase the efficiency and complement an income tax system. This suggests that validity of
the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem depends on how the process of human capital accumulation
is modelled. The result of this paper also suggests that empirical studies such as Dinardo and
Tobias (2001) and Tobias (2003) that showed the returns from human capital were different among
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individuals with different abilities have important implications for public policy. For example, as
Dinardo and Tobias (2001) and Tobias (2003) have shown, if the return from college education
is higher for people with higher ability, the subsidy to college education can have negative effect
on social welfare.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The Lagrangian is:
L =
∫ i∗
1
vu(i)nidi+
∫ 2
i∗
vs(i)nidi+
∫ i∗
1
µui {v˙u − auhui (g′ui/gui)}di+
∫ 2
i∗
µsi{v˙s − ashsi (g′si/gsi)}di
+β1{vsi∗ − vui∗}+ β2{Rsi∗ −Rui∗}
+λ
∫ i∗
1
{Rui − x(Rui , vui , wsi , wui , p1 + t)}nidi+ λ
∫ 2
i∗
{Rsi − x(Rsi , vsi , wsi , wui , p1 + t)}nidi
+λt
∫ 2
1
nic1idi+ βs{
∫ 2
i∗
gsih
s
idi−Hs}+ βu{
∫ i∗
1
guih
u
i di−Hu}
Denote x(Rji , v
j
i , w
s
i , w
u
i , p1 + t) as x
i where j = s, u. By using the integration by parts, we
obtain
L =
∫ i∗
1
vu(i)nidi+
∫ 2
i∗
vs(i)nidi+ µui∗v
u
i∗ − µu1vu1 −
∫ i∗
1
µ˙ui v
u
i di−
∫ i∗
1
µui a
uhui (g
′
ui/gui)di
µs2v
s
2 − µsi∗vsi∗ −
∫ 2
i∗
µ˙siv
s
i di−
∫ 2
i∗
µsia
shsi (g
′
si/gsi)di+ β1{vsi∗ − vui∗}+ β2{Rsi∗ −Rui∗}
+λ
∫ i∗
1
{Rui − x(Rui , vui , q, wsi , wui , p1 + t)}nidi+ λ
∫ 2
i∗
{Rsi − x(Rsi , vsi , wsi , wui , p1 + t)}nidi
+λt
∫ 2
1
nic1idi++βs{
∫ 2
i∗
gsih
s
idi−Hs}+ βu{
∫ i∗
1
guih
u
i di−Hu}
Denote x(Rji , v
j
i , w
s
i , w
j
i , p1 + t) as x
i where j = s, u. The first order condition for vsi , v
s
2, v
s
i∗ , R
s
i ,
Rsi∗ , v
u
i , v
u
i∗ , v
u
1 , R
u
i , R
u
i∗ ,H
s and Hu are
vsi : ni − µ˙si − λni
∂xi
∂vsi
+ λtni
∂c1i
∂xi
∂xi
∂vsi
= 0
vs2 : µ
s
2 = 0
vsi∗ : −µsi∗ + β1 = 0
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Rsi : [−µsi × as
g′si
gsi
+ βsgsi]
∂hsi
∂Rsi
+ λni − λni ∂xi
∂Rsi
+ λtni
∂c1i
∂xi
∂xi
∂Ri
= 0
Rsi∗ : β2 = 0
vui : ni − µ˙si − λni
∂xi
∂vsi
+ λtni
∂c1i
∂xi
∂xi
∂vsi
= 0
vui∗ : µ
u
i∗ − β1 = 0
vu1 : µ
u
1 = 0
Rui : [−µui × au
g′ui
gui
+ βugui]
∂hui
∂Rui
+ λni − λni ∂xi
∂Rui
+ λtni
∂c1i
∂xi
∂xi
∂Rui
= 0
Rui∗ : β2 = 0
Hs :
∂L
∂p1
∂p1
∂Hs
= βs
Hu :
∂L
∂p1
∂p1
∂Hu
= βu
Now we characterize those first order conditions. First, note that
µsi = µ
s
i∗ +
∫ i∗
1
nj(1− λ∂xj
∂vj
)dj and µui∗ = µ
u
1 +
∫ i∗
1
nj(1− λ∂xj
∂vj
)dj (16)
Since µsi∗ = µ
u
i∗ , µ
s
i =
∫ i
1 nj(1 − λ
∂xj
∂vj
)dj for i ∈ (i∗, 2) and µui =
∫ i
1 nj(1 − λ
∂xj
∂vj
)dj for
i ∈ (1, i∗) Note that ∂xj∂vj = 1/(Ux) . A single crossing property and the monotonicity of Rsi
and Rui guarantee that xi is increasing. This implies that
∂xj
∂vj
is increasing and the inside of the
integral is a decreasing function of i. Since µs2 = 0 and µ
u
1 = 0, the only way that those conditions
are satisfied is that initially ni(1 − λ∂xj∂vj ) is positive and after some i∗∗,it becomes negative. In
this case, for all is ∈ [i∗, 2) and iu ∈ (1, i∗], µsis and µuis are strictly positive.
Now we examine dW/dt and evaluate at t = 0. From the envelope theorem,
dW
dt
=
∂L
∂p1
∂p1
∂t
+ λ
∫ 2
1
nic1idi− λ
∫ 2
i∗
∂xi
∂(p1 + t)
nidi− λ
∫ i∗
1
∂xi
∂(p1 + t)
nidi
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where
∂L
∂p1
=
di∗
dp
{
vui∗ni∗ − vsi∗ni∗ + µ˙ui∗vui∗ + µui∗ ˙vui∗ − µ˙ui∗vui∗ − µui∗auhui∗
g′ui∗
gui∗
−µ˙si∗vsi∗ − µsi∗ v˙si∗ + µ˙si∗v(i∗) + µsi∗ashsi∗
g′si∗
gsi∗
+ β1{v˙si∗ − v˙ui∗}+ β2R˙ui∗ − β2R˙si∗
−λ{Rsi∗ − x(Rsi∗ , vsi∗ , p1 + t, wsi∗ , wui∗)}ni∗ + λ{Rui∗ − x(Rui∗ , vui∗ , p1 + t, wsi∗ , wui∗)}ni∗
−βsgsi∗hsi∗ + βugui∗hi∗}
+
{∫ 2
i∗
[−µsias(g′si/gsi) + βsgsi]
∂hsi
∂wsi
∂wsi
∂p1
di− λ
∫ 2
i∗
∂xi
∂wsi
∂wsi
∂p1
nidi
}
+
{∫ 2
i∗
[−µui au(g′ui/gui) + βugui]
∂hui
∂wui
∂wui
∂p1
− λ
∫ i∗
1
∂xi
∂wui
∂wui
∂p1
nidi
}
−λ
∫ 2
i∗
∂xi
∂(p1 + t)
nidi− λ
∫ i∗
1
∂xi
∂(p1 + t)
nidi
By using the above first order conditions, we have
∂L
∂p1
=
di∗
dp1
{
µsi∗a
shsi
g′s
gs
− µui∗auhui
g′u
gu
− βsgsi∗hsi∗ + βsgsi∗hsi∗
}
+
{∫ 2
i∗
[−µsias(g′si/gsi) + βsgsi]
∂hsi
∂wsi
∂wsi
∂p1
di− λ
∫ 2
i∗
∂xi
∂wsi
∂wsi
∂p1
nidi
}
+
{∫ 2
i∗
[−µui au(g′ui/gui) + βugui]
∂hui
∂wui
∂wui
∂p1
− λ
∫ i∗
1
∂xi
∂wui
∂wui
∂p1
nidi
}
− λ
∫ 2
i∗
∂xi
∂(p1 + t)
nidi− λ
∫ i∗
1
∂xi
∂(p1 + t)
nidi
Now we need to calculate the inside of the integral. Note that from the definition of hsi and h
u
i ,
we have
∂hsi
∂wsi
= −hsi
∂hsi
∂Rsi
and
∂hui
∂wui
= −hui
∂hui
∂Rui
This implies that
[−µsias(g′si/gsi) + βsgsi]
∂hsi
∂wsi
= [µsia
ss(g′si/gsi)− βsgsi]hsi
∂hsi
∂Rsi
and [−µui au(g′ui/gui) + βugui]
∂hui
∂wui
= [µui a
u(g′ui/gui)− βugui]hui
∂hui
∂Rui
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By using the FOC of Rsi and R
u
i ,
[µsia
ss(g′si/gsi)− βsgsi]hsi
∂hsi
∂Rsi
= hsi{λni − λni
∂x
∂Rsi
}
[µsia
ss(g′si/gsi)− βugsi]hui
∂hui
∂Rui
= hui {λni − λni
∂x
∂Rui
}
Thus, ∂L∂p1 is
∂L
∂p1
=
di∗
dt
{
µsi∗a
shsi
g′si∗
gsi∗
− µui∗auhui
g′ui∗
gui∗
− βsgsi∗hsi∗ + βugui∗hui∗
}
+
{∫ 2
i∗
hsi{λni − λni
∂xi
∂Rsi
}∂w
s
i
∂p1
di− λ
∫ 2
i∗
∂xi
∂wsi
∂wsi
∂p1
nidi
}
+
{∫ 2
i∗
hui {λni − λni
∂xi
∂Rui
}∂w
u
i
∂p1
di− λ
∫ i∗
1
∂xi
∂wui
∂wui
∂p1
nidi
}
− λ
∫ 2
i∗
∂xi
∂(p1 + t)
nidi− λ
∫ i∗
1
∂xi
∂(p1 + t)
nidi
Next, we need to calculate λ
∫ 2
i∗ h
s
ini
∂wsi
∂p1
+λ
∫ i∗
1 h
u
i ni
∂wui
∂p1
di. Note that λ
∫ 2
i∗ h
s
ini
∂wsi
∂p1
+λ
∫ i∗
1 h
u
i ni
∂wui
∂p1
di =
λ
∫ 2
i∗ h
s
igsii
∂ws
∂p1
+ λ
∫ i∗
1 h
u
i guini
∂wu
∂p1
di. λ
∫ 2
i∗ h
s
igsii
∂ws
∂p1
+ λ
∫ i∗
1 h
u
i guini
∂wu
∂p1
di is a change of total
earning due to a change of the price of good 1 when levels of human capital of all individu-
als are fixed. On the other hand, from perfect competition, for given level of human capital
of all individuals, the total revenue of the firm should be equal to the total payment to fac-
tor owners. Thus, p1y1 + y2 = ws
∫ 2
i∗ nih
s
igsidi + w
u
∫ i∗
1 nih
u
i guidi always holds. Let Q(p1)
be the total revenue of firms when all human capital level of all individuals are fixed. Then,
dQ/dp1 = λ
∫ 2
i∗ h
s
igsii
∂ws
∂p1
+ λ
∫ i∗
1 h
u
i guini
∂wu
∂p1
di. By definition of Q(p1)
Q(p1) ≡ max p1y1 + y2 s.t. (y1, y2) ∈ Γ(Hs,Hu)
Hs and Hu are fixed.
From the envelope theorem, dQdp1 = y1. Therefore, we have
λy1 = λ
∂ws
∂σ
∫ 2
i∗
hsigsini + λ
∂wu
∂σ
∫ i∗
1
hui guinidi.
Third, we will show that hsi
∂x
∂Rsi
= − ∂x∂wsi and h
u
i
∂x
∂Rui
= − ∂x∂wui . From the definition of Z, we
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have
∂Z
∂Rsi
= as/wsi and
∂Z
∂wsi
= −ashsi (1/wsi ) for i ∈ (i∗, 2)
∂Z
∂Rui
= au/wui and
∂Z
∂wui
= −auhui (1/wsi ) for i ∈ (1, i∗)
Thus, by using the definition of ∂x∂Rsi ,
∂x
∂ws ,
∂x
∂Rsi
, ∂x∂ws , we can check that h
s
i
∂x
∂Rsi
= − ∂x∂wsi and h
u
i
∂x
∂Rui
=
− ∂x∂wui .
Therefore, dL/dp1 is
∂L
∂p1
∣∣∣∣
σ=0
=
di∗
dp1
{
µsi∗a
shsi∗
g′s
gs
− µui∗auhui∗
g′u
gu
− ∂L
∂p1
∂p1
∂Hs
gsi∗h
s
i∗ +
∂L
∂p1
∂p1
∂Hu
gui∗h
u
i∗
}
From the FOC of Hs and Hu, we have
∂L
∂p1
{1 + di
∗
dp1
[
∂p1
∂Hs
gsi∗h
s
i∗ −
∂p1
∂Hu
gui∗h
u
i∗ ]} =
di∗
dp1
{
µsi∗a
shsi∗
g′s
gs
− µui∗auhui∗
g′u
gu
}
Therefore, this implies that
∂L
∂p1
=
di∗
dp1
4′
{
µsi∗a
shsi∗
g′s
gs
− µui∗auhui∗
g′u
gu
}
where 4′ = 1 + di∗dp1 [
∂p1
∂Hs gsi∗h
s
i∗ − ∂p1∂Hu gui∗hui∗ ] > 0. By using the definition of ∂p1/∂t, ∂p1/∂Hs
and ∂p1/∂H, we have
dW
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= Ψ1
di∗
dp1
{
µsi∗a
shsi∗
g′s
gs
− µui∗auhui∗
g′u
gu
}
where
where Ψ1 =
−RDp
RDp −RSp +RSHs ∂i∗∂p1 gsi∗hsi∗ −RSHu ∂i
∗
∂p1
gui∗hui∗
From the FOC of vsi∗ and v
u
i∗ , we have µ
s
i∗ = µ
u
i∗ . In addition, a
shsi
g′s
gs
and auhui
g′u
gu
are the right
side slope of vsi and the left side slope v
u
i at i
∗ From Lemma 1, the slope of vsi is steeper than the
slope of vui at i
∗. Since di
∗
dp1
< 0, dWdt > 0.
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Proof of the Proposition 2
Let µi and λ be the Lagrangian multiplier of the incentive constraint and the resource constraint.
Denote x(Rji , vi, w
s
i , w
u
i , p1 + t) as x
i. Then, the Lagrangian function is
W (t) =
∫ 2
1
vinidi+
∫ 2
1
µi[
dv
di
− f ′s(hsi )hsi (g′si/gsi)− f ′u(hui )hui (g′ui/gui)di]+
+λ
∫ 2
1
ni{Ri − xi}di+ t
∫ 2
1
nic1idi
+βs{
∫ 2
1
gsih
s
idi−Hs}+ βu{
∫ 2
1
guih
u
i di−Hu}
By using the integration by parts, we can obtain
W (t) =
∫ 2
1
vinidi+
∫ 2
1
µi
dv
di
di−
∫ 2
1
µif
′
s(h
s
i )h
s
i (g
′
si/gsi)di−
∫ 2
1
µif
′
u(h
u
i )h
u
i (g
′
ui/gui)di
+ λ
∫ 2
1
ni{Ri − xi}di+ λt
∫ 2
1
nic1idi+ βs{
∫ 2
1
gsih
s
idi−Hs}+ βu{
∫ 2
1
guih
u
i di−Hu}
=
∫ 2
1
vinidi+ µ2v2 − µ1v1 −
∫ 2
1
u˙ividi−
∫ 2
1
µif
′
s(h
s
i )h
s
i (g
′
si/gsi)di−
∫ 2
1
µif
′
u(h
u
i )h
u
i (g
′
ui/gui)di
+ λ
∫ 2
1
ni{Ri − xi}di+ λt
∫ 2
1
nic1idi+ βs{
∫ 2
1
gsih
s
idi−Hs}+ βu{
∫ 2
1
guih
u
i di−Hu}
the first-order-conditions are
vi : ni − u˙i − λni∂xi
∂vi
+ λtni
∂c1i
∂x
∂xi
∂vi
= 0
Ri : −µid[f
′
s(h
s
i )h
s
i (g
′
si/gsi)]
dhsi
∂hsi
∂Ri
− µid[f
′
u(h
u
i )h
u
i (g
′
ui/gui)]
dhui
∂hui
∂Ri
+ λni
+βsgsi
∂hsi
∂Ri
+ βugui
∂hui
∂Ri
− λni ∂xi
∂Ri
+ λtni
∂c1i
∂x
∂x
∂Ri
= 0
µ1 = 0 and µ2 = 0
From the FOC of vi, we will have ni − u˙i − λni ∂xi∂vi + λtni
∂c1i
∂xi
∂xi
∂vi
= 0
ni − λni∂xi
∂vi
= µ˙i
at t = 0. By integrating both sides and using the definition of ∂xi∂vi and µ1 = 0, we will have∫ i
1
ni{1− λ
Ux
} = µi
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From the first order condition of the revelation problem, Ux(p1, X)X ′(i) = ZRR′(i). This means
that the sign of X ′(i) and R′(i) are the same. Since v(i) is strictly increasing, X ′(i) and R′(i)
must be increasing. When X ′(i) is increasing, λUx is increasing. This implies that if at some i
∗∗,
1 − λ/Ux = 0, then for any i > i∗∗, 1 − λ/Ux < 0. However, µ2 = 0 from the FOC of v2. This
implies that µ1 is initially strictly positive until i∗∗ and then it begins to decrease and reaches
to zero at i = 2. Therefore, µi > 0 for all 1 < i < 2.
Now, we calculate the effect of increasing the commodity tax from t = 0. By using the
envelope theorem, we have
dW
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
=
∂L
∂p1
∂p1
∂t
+ λ
∫ 2
1
c1inidiλ+
∫ 2
1
[− ∂xi
∂(p1 + t)
]di
where ∂L/∂p1 is
∂L
∂p1
=
∫ 2
1
{−µid[f
′(hsi )h
s
i (g
′
si/gsi)]
dhsi
+ βsgsi}{ dh
s
i
dwsi
dwsi
dp1
+
dhsi
dwu
dwui
dp1
}di
+
∫ 2
1
{−µid[f
′(hui )h
u
i (g
′
ui/gui)]
dhui
+ βugui}{ dh
u
i
dwui
dwui
dp1
+
dhui
dwui
dwui
dp1
}di
+ λ
∫ 2
1
[− ∂xi
∂(p1 + t)
− ∂xi
∂wsi
∂wsi
∂p1
− ∂xi
∂wui
∂wui
∂p1
]nidi
Note that ∂xi/∂(p1 + t) = −(Up1)/(Ux). From the Roy’s identity, −(Up1)/(Ux) = c1i. There-
fore, λ
∫ 2
1 c1inidi = λ
∫ 2
1 (
∂xi
∂p1
)nidi. In addition, ∂xi∂wsi = zw
s
i
/Ux and ∂xi∂wu = zwu/Ux and
∂xi
∂Ri
=
ZRi/Ux. Using the definition of Zwsi and Zwu ,
∂xi
∂wsi
= −αihsi/Ux, ∂xi∂wu = −αihui /Ux and ∂xi∂Ri =
αi/Ux . Thus,
∫ 2
1 c1inidi =
∫ 2
1 [− ∂xi∂(p1+t)nidi. Therefore, we have
On the other hand, the FOC of Ri at t = 0 is that
{−µid[f
′
s(h
s
i )h
s
i (g
′
si/gsi)]
dhsi
+ βsgsi}∂h
s
i
∂Ri
+ {−µid[f
′
u(h
u
i )h
u
i (g
′
ui/gui)]
dhui
+ βugui}∂h
u
i
∂Ri
+λni = λniαi/Ux
Now, we will calculate λ
∫ 2
1 [− ∂xi∂wsi
∂wsi
∂p1
− ∂xi∂wui
∂wui
∂p1
]nidi. Note that −λ ∂xi∂wsi ni = λαinih
s
i/Ux and
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−λ ∂xi∂wui ni = λαinih
u
i /Ux. From the FOC of Ri, λ
∫ 2
1 [− ∂xi∂wsi
∂wsi
∂p1
− ∂xi∂wui
∂wui
∂p1
]nidi is equal to∫ 2
1
{(
−µid[f
′
s(h
s
i )h
s
i (g
′
si/gsi)]
dhsi
+ βsgsi
)
∂hsi
∂Ri
+
(
−µid[f
′
u(h
u
i )h
u
i (g
′
ui/gui)]
dhui
+ βugui
)
∂hui
∂Ri
+ λni
}
hsi
∂wsi
∂p1
di
+
{∫ 2
1
(
−µid[f
′
s(h
s
i )h
s
i (gsi/gsi)]
dhsi
+ βsgsi
)
∂hsi
∂Ri
+
(
−µid[f
′
u(h
u
i )h
u
i (g
′
ui/gui)]
dhui
+ βugui
)
∂hui
∂Ri
+ λni
}
hui
∂wui
∂p1
di
Therefore, ∂L/∂p1 becomes
∂L
∂p1
∣∣∣∣
t=0
=
{∫ 2
1
(
−µid[f
′
s(h
s
i )h
s
i (g
′
s/gs)]
dhsi
+ βsgsi
)
[{ dh
s
i
dwsi
+ hsi
∂hsi
∂Ri
}dw
s
i
dp1
+ { dh
s
i
dwui
+ hui
∂hsi
∂Ri
}dw
u
i
dp1
]di
−
∫ 2
1
(
−µid[f
′
u(h
u
i )h
u
i (g
′
u/gu)]
dhui
+ βugui
)
[{dh
u
i
dwsi
+
∂hui
∂Ri
hsi}
dwsi
dp1
+ { dh
u
i
dwui
+
∂hui
∂Ri
hui }
dwui
dp1
]di
+
∫ 2
1
[−λ ∂xi
∂(p1 + t)
+
∫ 2
1
λnih
s
i
∂wsi
∂p1
di+
∫ 2
1
λnih
u
i
∂wui
∂pi
di
}
Note that
∫ 2
1 λnih
s
i
∂wsi
∂σ di +
∫ 2
1 λnih
u
i
∂wu
∂σ di = λy
1 from the argument in the previous sub-
section. Therefore, +
∫ 2
1 [−λ ∂xi∂(p1+t) +
∫ 2
1 λnih
s
i
∂wsi
∂p1
di+
∫ 2
1 λnih
u
i
∂wui
∂pi
di = 0. We have
∂L
∂p1
=
{∫ 2
1
(
−µid[f
′
s(h
s
i )h
s
i (g
′
s/gs)]
dhsi
+ βsgsi
)
[
∂h˜si
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+
∂h˜si
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
+
∫ 2
1
(
−µid[f
′
u(h
u
i )h
u
i (g
′
u/gu)]
dhui
+ βugui
)
[
∂h˜ui
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+
∂h˜ui
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
}
From the FOC of Hs and Hu, βs = ∂W∂p1
∂p
∂Hs and βu =
∂W
∂p1
∂p
∂Hu . Thus,
∂L
∂p1
=
∫ 2
1
(
−µid[f
′
s(h
s
i )h
s
i (g
′
s/gs)]
dhsi
)
[
∂h˜si
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+
∂h˜si
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
+
∫ 2
1
(
−µid[f
′
u(h
u
i )h
u
i (g
′
u/gu)]
dhui
)
[
∂h˜ui
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+
∂h˜ui
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
+
∂L
∂p1
(∫ 2
1
∂p
∂Hs
gsi [
∂h˜si
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+
∂h˜si
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di+
∫ 2
1
∂p
∂Hu
gui [
∂h˜ui
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+
∂h˜ui
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
)
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Solving for ∂L∂p1 , we have
∂L
∂p1
=
1
4
{∫ 2
1
(
−µid[f
′
s(h
s
i )h
s
i (g
′
s/gs)]
dhsi
)
[
∂h˜si
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+
∂h˜si
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
∫ 2
1
(
−µid[f
′
u(h
u
i )h
u
i (g
′
u/gu)]
dhui
)
[
∂h˜ui
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+
∂h˜ui
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
}
where 4 = 1−
(∫ 2
1
∂p
∂Hs g
s
i [
∂h˜si
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+ ∂h˜
s
i
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di+
∫ 2
1
∂p
∂Hu g
u
i [
∂h˜ui
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+ ∂h˜
u
i
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
)
> 0.
∂W
∂p1
=
1
4
{∫ 2
1
(
−µi[f
′′
s (h
s
i )h
s
i
f ′s(hsi )
+ 1](g
′
s/gs)
)
[f ′s
∂h˜si
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+ f ′s
∂h˜si
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
∫ 2
1
(
−µi[f
′′
u (h
u
i )h
u
i
f ′u(hui )
+ 1](g
′
u/gu)
)
[f ′u
∂h˜ui
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+ f ′u
∂h˜ui
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
}
From the definition of h˜si and h˜
u
i , we have
f ′s(h˜
s
i )
∂h˜si
∂wsi
+ f ′u(h˜
u
i )
∂h˜ui
∂wsi
= 0 and f ′u(h˜
s
i )
∂h˜si
∂wui
+ f ′u(h˜
u
i )
∂h˜ui
∂wui
= 0
Therefore, we have
∂L
∂p1
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= − 14
{∫ 2
1
µi
(
[
f ′′s (hsi )h
s
i
f ′s(hsi )
+ 1](g
′
s/gs)− [
f ′′u (hui )h
u
i
f ′u(hui )
+ 1](g
′
u/gu)
)
f is[
∂h˜si
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+ f ′s
∂h˜si
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
}
= − 14
{∫ 2
1
µi[γs(g
′
s/gs)− γu(g
′
u/gu)]f
i
s[
∂h˜si
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+ f ′s
∂h˜si
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
}
Using the definition of ∂p1/∂Hs and ∂p1/∂Hu, This implies that dW/dt is equal to
dW
dt1
= −Ψ2
{∫ 2
1
µi[γs(g
′
s/gs)− γu(g
′
u/gu)]f
i
s[
∂h˜si
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+ f ′s
∂h˜si
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
}
where
Ψ2 =
−RDp
RDp1 −RSp1 −RSHs
∫ 2
1 g
s
i [
∂h˜si
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+ ∂h˜
s
i
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di−RSHu
∫ 2
1 g
u
i [
∂h˜ui
∂wsi
dwsi
dp1
+ ∂h˜
u
i
∂wui
dwui
dp1
]di
From the condition of the comparative advantage, γs(g
′
s/gs) − γu(g
′
u/gu) > 0. In addition,
Ψ2 < 0. Thus, dWdt > 0.
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Figure 1: The Graph of v(i)
